BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 5

Article 6

12-1-2011

Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible
Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants
Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex
Marriage
Matthew Chandler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Religion Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Matthew Chandler, Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to
Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1625 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss5/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

11/10/2011 5:23 PM

Moral Mandate or Personal Preference? Possible
Avenues for Accommodation of Civil Servants
Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage
I. INTRODUCTION
As many states begin allowing same-sex marriage, civil servants
with certain religious beliefs will be forced to either perform
marriages they morally oppose or resign, effectively “choos[ing]
between conscience and livelihood.”1 This clash of belief and
vocation has already occurred for some individuals,2 and it will
certainly reoccur as same-gender marriage is permitted in a growing
number of states.3 Despite this conflict, no state has accommodated
the religious beliefs of the civil servants directly involved in the
marriage process.4
Recently, scholars have argued that both empirical evidence5 and
the very justifications for same-sex marriage6 support the
accommodation of civil servants with a conscientious objection to
facilitating same-sex marriages. They argue that, although some
individuals may see religious beliefs as mere preferences, this attitude
ignores the role of religion in the history of our nation and in the life
of the believer and the goal of creating a tolerant and accepting
society, a goal proponents of same-sex marriage advocate.7
1. Robin Wilson, Gay Marriage Laws Should Allow for Conscientious Objectors, PRESS
ATLANTIC CITY, May 10, 2009, http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/opinion/
commentary/article_22a9dd43-3de8-502b-b09b-b83d93cbce29.html; see also infra Part II.
2. See infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
3. Many states are still in the process of determining whether they will allow same-sex
marriage, and some likely will. See, e.g., GLAAD, Rhode Island Working Towards Legal Gay
Marriage, OPPOSING VIEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.opposingviews.com/i/rhode-islandworking-towards-legal-gay-marriage (stating that a bill that would allow same-sex marriage is
currently being considered by the Rhode Island legislature).
4. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee
Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 320 (2010), available
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/v5/n2/6/6Wilson.pdf.
5. Id. passim.
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. See J. David Bleich, The Physician as a Conscientious Objector, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 245, 248 (2002) (arguing that seeing religious beliefs as mere preferences “not only fails
to respect the role of religion in the life and value system of the religionist, but also fails to
recognize the historical and pragmatic basis from which the principle of religious freedom
OF
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This Comment agrees with other scholars who assert that civil
servants’ beliefs are legitimate, important, and worthy of
accommodation, and furthers this discussion by reviewing how these
beliefs may best be accommodated. When considering how to best
accommodate civil servants with a conscientious objection to samesex marriage, it can be helpful to examine how conscience is already
accommodated in other situations. This Comment examines both
the primary avenues of accommodation8 and the specific
accommodations available9 in a variety of contexts.
This Comment, based on a review of other exemptions,
concludes that enacting legislation to accommodate civil servants
while still providing equal service to all members of the public10
would be both the most effective method of accommodation and the
method most likely to be enacted by legislatures. The current
methods of accommodation provide little protection for
conscientious objectors because legislatures enact them infrequently
and courts interpret them narrowly.11
Before reaching these conclusions, Part II of this Comment first
describes the current state of the law. It does this by 1) providing an
overview of the limited religious accommodations that currently exist
for objectors to same-sex marriage and 2) summarizing justifications
for accommodation of civil servants. Part III then presents the
history and development of conscientious objection in the United
States. Part IV provides an overview of the currently available
avenues of accommodation of religious belief in the United States.
Part V reviews how various avenues are used to accommodate
conscientious objectors in a variety of different contexts. Finally, in
Part VI, this Comment 1) concludes that the best avenue for
accommodation is ad hoc exemptions and 2) explores how ad hoc

developed”); see also infra Part II.C.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
10. This method is similar to methods proposed by other scholars. See, e.g., Thomas C.
Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. &
SOC. POL’Y 206, 226–32 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/
njlsp/v5/n2/1/1Berg.pdf. This is also similar to an information-forcing system suggested by
some scholars. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage from the Health care Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 98 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008).
11. See infra Part V.
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exemptions can effectively accommodate civil servants who object to
facilitating same-sex marriage.
II. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: THE NEED FOR
ACCOMMODATION OF CIVIL SERVANTS WHO OBJECT TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE
A. Public Concern About Effects of Same-Sex Marriage on Religious
Organizations
In the same-sex marriage debate, there has been a great deal of
concern over the effect that same-sex marriage would have on
religious organizations. For example, when Proposition 8, a
proposed amendment to the California constitution stating that
“[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized
in California,”12 was under consideration by the citizens of that state,
many supporters of the amendment argued that without it,
individuals’ religious freedom would be taken away.13
One specific ad quoted San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom’s
statement that “[same-sex marriage is] gonna happen, whether you
like it or not.”14 This ad, seen as one of the most effective ads
supporting the amendment,15 proceeded to list what the proponents
of the amendment felt could happen if it were not passed, which
included the claim that “churches could lose their tax exemption.”16
Other ads endorsing the amendment cautioned that if the
12. Proposition 8 became law in 2008. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
13. See, e.g., infra notes 17–19.
14. VoteYesonProp8, Yes on 8 TV Ad: Whether You Like It Or Not, YOUTUBE (Sept. 29,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kKn5LNhNto.
15. Jonathan Darman, Hoping that Left Is Right, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2009, at 44,
available
at
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/01/16/hoping-that-left-is-right.html.
Another story noted that:
Those words would come back to haunt Newsom and the campaign in support of
same-sex marriage. It became the battle cry of the opponents of same-sex marriage,
featured in radio and TV advertisements to display not just Newsom’s perceived
arrogance, but also the fear that supporters of gay and lesbian rights planned to
trample over the beliefs of the rest of the state.
Erin Allday, Newsom Was Central to Same-Sex Marriage Saga, SFGATE.COM (Nov. 6, 2008),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-11-06/news/17128179_1_same-sex-marriage-gays-andlesbians-city-hall/5; see also Michael Foust, ‘Historic’ Campaign Scored Prop 8’s Win in
California, BAPTIST PRESS, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.bpnews.net/BPnews.asp?ID=29277
(“Those over-the-top words made their way into the first Yes on 8 commercial and helped
energize Prop 8 supporters.”).
16. Foust, supra note 15.
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amendment was not passed, “churches that rent out their facilities
for marriages could be forced to allow same-sex marriages on their
properties,”17 and that churches could even be forced to marry samesex couples or lose their tax-exempt status, thereby being “taxed out
of existence.”18 Concerns about the effect that same-sex marriage
could have on religious liberty were widespread enough that they
were specifically addressed both by news reports and by those who
opposed Proposition 8.19 Ultimately, these concerns seemed to strike
a chord with many of those who voted for the amendment20 and may
have made a difference in the passage of Proposition 8, which
ultimately passed by only a 4.6% margin.21
States that have allowed same-sex marriage have manifested
similar concerns about the effect of same-sex marriage on religious
organizations. A recent review of these accommodations by Robin
Fretwell Wilson22 found that the states where same-sex marriage is
allowed “that have embraced meaningful23 religious liberty

17. PreservingMarriage, YES on Proposition 8 (Prop 8) Your Rights, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-jc4ujp9Ok. This concern was realized when
“New Jersey’s Ocean Grove Campground, a religious nonprofit, lost its tax-exempt status in
2007 because the organization refused to rent its facility to a lesbian couple for a civil
commitment ceremony.” Dean R. Broyles, Gay Rights and the 1st Amendment on a Collision
Course, LATIMES.COM (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oewbroyles-jean27-2008oct27,0,7357456.story.
18. Churches May Have Their Tax Exempt Status Challenged or Revoked, WHAT IS
PROP8?, http://whatisprop8.com/churches-may-have-their-tax-exempt-status-challenged-orrevoked.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also Should Gay Marriage Be Legal?,
PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (stating that samesex marriage conflicts “with the beliefs, sacred texts, and traditions of many religious groups”
and “[e]xpanding marriage to include same-sex couples may lead to churches being forced to
marry couples and children being taught in school that same-sex marriage is the same as
opposite-sex marriage”).
19. E.g., Michael Gardner, Law Professors Enter Prop. 8 Fray on Church’s Tax-Exempt
Status, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008, at A3, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20081030/news_1n30exempt.html
(stating
that although some experts insisted that “no religious officiant will be required to solemnize a
marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs . . . . Some church leaders are not
convinced” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Scott Bidstrup, Gay Marriage: The Arguments
and the Motives, BIDSTRUP.COM, http://www.bidstrup.com/marriage.htm (last visited Sept.
20, 2011) (arguing that churches would not be forced to conduct same-sex marriages).
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL
ELECTION 7 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/
sov_complete.pdf.
22. Wilson, supra note 4, at 319–22.
23. As Wilson notes, some of these exemptions amount to no more than “hollow
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protections have exempted religious groups and individuals
authorized to preside over marriage ceremonies.”24 These
exemptions insulate “private religious groups that refuse to provide
services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
for the solemnization of same-sex marriage” from both lawsuit and
government penalty.25
B. Lack of Public Concern for the Effects of Same-Sex Marriage on
Individuals
Unfortunately, individual conscientious objectors have not
received the same attention or protection that religious organizations
have received. In her review of states’ accommodation of individuals
with a conscientious objection to same-sex marriage,26 Wilson found
that “not a single state has shielded the government employee at the
front line of same-sex marriage.”27 After describing the results of this
review, Wilson concluded that
states at the leading edge of same-sex marriage legislation have
disproportionately insulated large religious institutions and their
employees from the conflicts ushered in by same-sex marriage,
while doing relatively little for individual believers. Notably absent
from these early protections are marriage registrars, clerks working
in the licensing office, and others who may be asked to facilitate
same-sex marriages despite their own deeply held religious beliefs.28

While there has been “some academic prodding”29 and the issue
has received limited media coverage,30 the issue of accommodation
protection.” Id. at 319 n.7.
24. Id. at 319–20 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Id. at 319–22.
27. Id. at 320.
28. Id. at 321.
29. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom,
5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 275 (2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
journals/njlsp/v5/n2/4/4Lupu.pdf. For examples of this academic prodding, see Wilson,
supra note 4 passim, and Berg, supra note 10, at 207 (arguing, although not specifically about
government employees, that “significant religious accommodations for objectors to same-sex
marriages” should be adopted).
30. See, e.g., Chaz Muth, Scholars: Church Won’t Be Forced to Marry Gay Couples If Laws
Change, AMERICANCATHOLIC.ORG (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.americancatholic.org/
news/report.aspx?id=844 (“Legalizing same-sex marriage . . . could force county clerks to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, even if such an act goes against their religious
beliefs . . . .”).
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for civil servants has not received much public attention. The
minimal governmental discussion that has taken place has not
resulted in any actual accommodation for civil servants,31 leaving
them to “choose between conscience and livelihood.”32 Faced with
this choice, some governmental employees who were required to
issue licenses to33 or preside over the marriage of34 same-sex couples
chose to resign instead.35
This effectively gives religious belief less weight than a mere
scheduling conflict—for example, justices of the peace in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire were told that they could not
abstain from marrying same-sex couples because of their sexual
orientation, even though these same justices of the peace could “turn
down a request to marry any individual couple . . . because the
[justice of the peace] [wa]s busy, or just [did not] get along with the
couple.”36

31. In Massachusetts, justices of the peace were told “that there would be plenty of
room for conscientious objectors” and “there would be user-friendly [justice of the peace}
websites where same-sex couples could obtain names of [justices of the peace] who would be
happy to marry them, and that there would still be room [for justices of the peace who
objected to personally solemnizing marriages of same-sex couples].” Morning Edition: Mass.
Justice of the Peace Resigns Over Gay Marriage (NPR radio broadcast May 14, 2004), available
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1896321. In the end, no
protections were extended, and justices of the peace were told “to resign if they were unwilling
to preside over the marriage of same-sex couples.” Jennifer Peter, Justices of the Peace Warned
Not to Discriminate Against Same Sex Couples, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 25, 2004, available at
http://www.gaypasg.org/gaypasg/PressClippings/2004/April%202004/justices_of_the_pea
ce_warned_not.htm; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 275 (“[N]o state has yet been
willing to grant public officials . . . exemptions from state-created obligations to serve without
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”).
32. Wilson, supra note 1.
33. Id. (“In Iowa, the state’s attorney general told county recorders that they must issue
licenses to same-sex couples or face criminal misdemeanor charges and even dismissal.”).
34. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, through his legal counsel, “told the state’s
justices of the peace . . . to resign if they are unwilling to preside over the marriage of same-sex
couples.” Peter, supra note 31; accord Morning Edition, supra note 31.
35. E.g., Resignation Letter from Linda Gray Kelley, JUST. OF THE PEACE ASS’NS
NEWSL. (2004), http://jpus.org/newsletter/summer2004doc.htm#resign.
36. Lauren Garrison, Some JPs Bristle at Same-Sex Marriage Law, NEW HAVEN REG.,
Nov. 30, 2008, http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2008/11/30/news/a1justiceof
peace.txt?viewmode=fullstory; see also Morning Edition, supra note 31 (explaining that when
justices of the peace in Massachusetts are busy, they can turn down individual couples).
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This lack of public concern for the religious beliefs of individuals
is likely due to the fact that there are a “relatively small number of
[individuals] who find themselves morally conflicted.”37 “The
problems of the few seldom become the concern of the many,”38 and
when the public at large lacks concern for an issue, representatives
will likely follow suit. However, the lack of interest in protecting
these individuals does not make the conflict they face any less
pressing. With same-sex marriage laws being enacted in an increasing
number of states, these conflicts between rights, responsibilities, and
beliefs will likely be faced by a growing number of government
employees.
C. Why Civil Servants Should Be Accommodated
Before engaging in a review of how conscience is and has been
protected in the United States, this Comment will briefly discuss
various theories behind why conscientious objectors should or
should not be protected. The debate centers on religious liberty and
personal autonomy.
With the introduction of same-sex marriage in a number of
states, many religious organizations have been accommodated, but
no government employee has been afforded the same religious
objection accommodation.39 The debate surrounding religious
objection accommodations seems to stem from a difference in
viewpoint regarding the role of religion in individuals’ lives, with
those that see religious beliefs as preferences, rather than mandates,40
calling for much less accommodation for conscientious objectors.
Ironically, this suggests that many arguments against
37. Bleich, supra note 7, at 247.
38. Id.
39. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 318–22.
40. After stating that one problem with the health care mandate was the small number
of individuals affected, Bleich states:
A more serious hurdle lies in the unwillingness of many medical institutions, as well
as society, to recognize the existence of a genuine moral dilemma. . . . While
continuing to pay at least lip service to the role of religion in society, society simply
does not take religion and religious scruples as seriously as it did in days gone by.
The prevailing notion seems to be that religious preferences are precisely that,
namely, preferences, but not mandates. Thus, just as recreational, aesthetic, or
gastronomical preferences must bow to laws of general applicability, it is assumed
that religious preferences must bow to the demands of the dominant culture that are
enshrined in statute.
Bleich, supra note 7, at 247–48.
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accommodation directly mirror arguments against same-sex
marriage—some on both sides see the other as seeking special
treatment to indulge a mere personal preference.
There are a number of other similarities between the arguments
for same-sex marriage and the arguments for accommodation of
those who oppose it.41 As one scholar recently noted,
Recognition of same-sex marriage, whatever technical form legal
arguments made on its behalf take, exemplifies a “live and let live”
policy. That same policy should apply equally to religious believers
who oppose same-sex marriage—they should not be required to act
directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that
appear to confer their personal blessing on such marriages.42

The previous debate over whether same-sex marriage should be
allowed is echoed in other ways as well. For example, “the refusal to
consider religious liberty claims is in part fueled by anger at some of
the more outrageous statements about gays made by religious leaders
over the years.”43 However, these reasons are not valid if they force
civil servants to violate their religious beliefs and do not overcome
the empirical evidence supporting44 equality-based justifications for
accommodation of conscience.
III. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION, CONSCIENCE, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Historical Recognition of Conscience in the United States and
Abroad
Freedom of conscience is recognized and addressed to some
degree both in the United States and internationally.45 Explicit
41. Thomas C. Berg provides an excellent review of how “[s]everal key arguments that
have led states to recognize same-sex marriage also call for broad accommodations for religious
objectors.” Berg, supra note 10, at 212–20 (discussing how both arguments deal with
“Conduct Fundamental to Identity” and “Conduct Lived Out Publicly in Civil Society”).
42. Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y
307, 312–14
(2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njlsp/
v5/n2/5/index.html (endorsing accommodation only of private actors and not government
employees).
43. Id. at 310
44. See Wilson, supra note 4, passim.
45. As one example of the international recognition of conscience, Article 18 of The
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right
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protection of conscience in the United States was considered by the
founding fathers, with Madison’s initial draft of the First
Amendment stating: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretence, infringed.”46
B. Development of Conscientious Objection in the United States
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mandate
freedom of conscience, the freedom could arguably be read into its
text. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court declined to infer an
unstated right to freedom of conscience from the First Amendment,
the Free Exercise Clause could be read to require that laws
accommodate individuals’ moral beliefs. However, Supreme Court
jurisprudence has led the law to the point where neither of these
mechanisms requires significant accommodation of belief.
1. No defined constitutional protection of conscience
Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s textual silence
regarding freedom of conscience, the Court could have inferred an
unenumerated right to freedom of conscience from the religion
clauses. The Supreme Court first examined this issue when deciding
“whether conscientious objectors have a Constitutional right to
refrain from participating in the military”47 in United States v.

includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948), reprinted in JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENY ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed. Doc. Supp.
1981). For additional examples, see Marie-France Major, Conscientious Objection and
International Law: A Human Right?, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 349 passim (1992)
and Emily N. Marcus, Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 507 passim (1998).
46. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); see also B.A. Robinson,
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Religious Aspects, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG,
http://www.religioustolerance.org/amend_1.htm (last updated July 3, 2010) (listing
language of previous drafts of the First Amendment, many explicitly protecting conscience).
47. Michael P. Seng, Conscientious Objection: Will the United States Accommodate Those
Who Reject Violence as a Means of Dispute Resolution?, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 121, 126
(1992).

1633

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/10/2011 5:23 PM

2011

Schwimmer.48 The Court held that the United States could withhold
citizenship from a pacifist who was otherwise qualified for
naturalization solely because, although she herself felt qualified to do
so,49 the Court “found her unable . . . to take the prescribed oath of
allegiance.”50 Specifically, when asked: “‘If necessary, are you willing
to take up arms in defense of the country?’ She answered: ‘I would
not take up arms personally.’”51 That the Court declined to find a
right to conscientious objection is especially surprising when one
considers the facts of this case: women have never been drafted by
the United States, and at over fifty years old,52 even men her age
were not eligible for the draft.53 Therefore, she could not have been
drafted, regardless of her willingness to take up arms.
In 1946, the Court in Girouard v. United States54 addressed a
case with facts almost identical to those in Schwimmer, this time
finding that conscientious objectors had a right to be naturalized
under the Act.55 The majority’s reasoning for their decision discussed
the importance of conscience as follows:
The struggle for religious liberty has through the centuries been an
effort to accommodate the demands of the State to the conscience of the
individual. The victory for freedom of thought recorded in our Bill
of Rights recognizes that in the domain of conscience there is a moral
power higher than the State. Throughout the ages men have suffered
death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to the
authority of the State. Freedom of religion guaranteed by the First
Amendment is the product of that struggle.56

This recognition of conscience, that state law should accommodate
it, and the incorporation of these principles within the First
Amendment, gave “hope that the Court would hold that
conscientious objection was protected by the Constitution.”57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

1634

279 U.S. 644 (1929).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 653 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 648 (majority opinion).
328 U.S. 61 (1946).
Id. at 62, 70.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
Seng, supra note 47, at 127.
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However, the Court made it clear in Gillette v. United States58 that it
would not recognize such a protection in the Constitution.59
The accommodation that Congress had provided to
conscientious objectors in the Selective Service and Training Act60
limited its exemption to only those “who, by reason of religious
training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form.”61 Although the Court held in Gillette that the
Selective Service Act did not violate the Establishment Clause,62 it
also held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require Congress to
exempt individuals who objected to the draft on religious grounds
from participation in a particular war.63 Through this holding, the
Court essentially refused to read a protection of conscience into the
First Amendment.64 This resulted in what religious-freedom scholar
Eugene Volokh has termed “the statutory exemption model,”65
where exemptions are available for religious objectors “if and only if
the statute provided for one.”66
2. The expansion and later narrowing of the Free Exercise Clause
Although the Court declined to read protection of conscience
into the First Amendment, the text of the Free Exercise Clause itself
could support a claim for exemption from laws that coerce
individuals to engage in conduct that conflicts with their religious
beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner,67 the Supreme Court first interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause to provide this sort of protection under
what has been deemed the “constitutional exemption model.”68

58. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
59. Seng, supra note 47, at 127.
60. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 451–473 (1988)).
61. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 452–53.
63. Id. at 461–62.
64. See Seng, supra note 47, at 127.
65. Eugene Volokh, Some Background on Religious Exemption Law, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 12, 2010, 7:07 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/12/somebackground-on-religious-exemption-law-2/.
66. Id.
67. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the First Amendment compelled
accommodation for a Sabbatarian who was denied unemployment benefits because she refused
to accept a job that would have required her to work on Saturday).
68. Volokh, supra note 65.
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Under this model, “sincere religious objectors had a presumptive
constitutional right to an exemption,” although this presumption
could be overcome if the government could meet strict scrutiny by
showing the law they seek to apply to the objector “is the least
restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest.”69 By
making religious objection a constitutional matter, this model
substantially increased the accommodations that religious objectors
could receive.
Notwithstanding its constitutional basis, the constitutional
exception model was drastically narrowed by subsequent cases. In
Employment Division v. Smith,70 the Court held that the First
Amendment did not require any accommodation from a law
prohibiting the use of peyote for individuals who ingested peyote for
legitimate and sincere religious purposes.71 The majority opinion
supported this holding with extremely broad language, stating that
“[t]he mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen
from the discharge of political responsibilities.”72 In doing this, the
Court essentially “rejected the constitutional exemption regime” and
“returned to the statutory exemption regime.”73
The Court’s holdings in Smith and its progeny strongly suggest
that, as far as federal law is concerned,74 “broad constitutional
arguments appealing to freedom of religion or of conscience [are
unlikely to] prevail before the courts in the immediate future.”75 As
other scholars have noted, these cases make the likelihood of success
of federal constitutional claims for accommodation of religion seem
very doubtful, as plaintiffs are now required to show that the “antidiscrimination rules from which they seek exemption are not

69. Id. However, Volokh also notes that although the Court describes the strict-scrutiny
test in the same way it is described when applied in other contexts, in practice courts give the
government much more leeway than usual when applying the test in the religious freedom
context. See id. (describing the test as going from “strict in theory, fatal in fact” generally, to
“strict in theory, feeble in fact” in the religious freedom context) (citations omitted).
70. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
71. Id. at 890.
72. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–
95 (1940)).
73. Volokh, supra note 65. It should also be noted that the Court has not overruled the
pre-Smith cases that required accommodations under “strict scrutiny” review.
74. State protections may still be available; see infra Part IV.A.2.
75. Seng, supra note 47, at 127–28.
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‘neutral, generally applicable regulatory law[s]’” to survive Smith.76
“Because protections for same-sex couples do not specifically target
religious conduct or motives, the Free Exercise Clause offers no
support for exemption claims.”77
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AVENUES OF ACCOMMODATION
Although the Court has not established a right to
accommodation of conscience or required more than rational basis
review for laws that infringe on religious exercise, other avenues of
accommodation are available. This Part provides a brief overview of
the remaining methods of accommodation used in the United States,
and is followed by Part V, which describes the specific
accommodations
that
have
been
extended.
Post-Smith,
accommodation is usually provided by the legislature,78 either
through a specific state or federal statute or a state constitution.
Methods of accommodation fall into two general categories: 1)
legislative measures protecting free exercise generally and 2) ad hoc
legislative measures granting accommodation in specific contexts. In
each of these contexts, both federal and state legislatures have
provided some degree of accommodation for conscientious
objectors.

76. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 287 (alternation in original) (quoting Smith, 494
U.S. at 880). Other scholars have reached the same conclusion regarding the application of
Smith to First Amendment claims in the religious liberty context. For example, one scholar
notes:
As a matter of current First Amendment doctrine, there is much force to the claim
that there is no legally important clash between religious liberty and equal
recognition of same-sex marriage. The controlling case in this area is Employment
Division v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court held that facially neutral, generally
applicable laws burdening religion need no special legislative justification and,
therefore, would not be subject to compelling (or other heightened) interest
analysis. Laws that mandate the acceptance of the validity of same-sex marriage
would be neutral laws of general applicability and, hence, would require no special
justification to satisfy the federal constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion.
Stern, supra note 42, at 310 (footnotes omitted).
77. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 287–88.
78. Volokh, supra note 65 (also admitting that this is an oversimplification).
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A. Overview of Legislative and Constitutional Measures Protecting
Free Exercise Generally
1. Congressional legislation
Since Smith, the treatment of claims for religious exemption has
become fractured, with the correct standard depending on context.
This began soon after the Smith decision when Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).79 This Act sought to
restore the pre-Smith constitutional exemption regime.80
However, four years after its passage, the Court in City of Boerne
v. Flores81 struck RFRA as unconstitutional when applied against state
law.82 Congress’s powers “are defined and limited,” and therefore
the legislation it enacts must be supported by one of those
enumerated powers.83 RFRA was passed under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, which allows Congress to enforce the provisions of the
Amendment.84 However, the Court held that “RFRA contradicts
vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the
federal balance”85 due to its “[s]weeping coverage” that “ensures its
intrusion at every level of government.”86 This did not eliminate the
Act entirely, as its scope was later amended to comply with City of
Boerne.87 This revision seems to be constitutionally appropriate, as

79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
80. Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current
Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 191, 205–06 (2009) (“The legislative history of RFRA
provides clear evidence of Congress’s intent to reverse the effect of the Smith decision.” (citing
139 CONG. REC. E1243-03 to E1244-01 (daily ed. May 12, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Franks); 139 CONG. REC. E1234-01 (daily ed. May 12, 1993) (statement of Rep. Cardin);
139 CONG. REC. H2356-03 to H2357-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Brooks); 139 CONG. REC. H2361-03 to H2362-01 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Tucker); S. REP. 103-111, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898;
H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993))).
81. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
82. Id. at 535.
83. Id. at 516–17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 517.
85. Id. at 536.
86. Id. at 532.
87. Carl H. Esbeck, The Application of RFRA to Override Employment NonDiscrimination Clauses Embedded in Federal Social Service Programs, 9 ENGAGE 140, 143 n.11
(June 2008), available at http://library.findlaw.com/2008/ Jun/1/247208.html.
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the Court has applied the amended version of the Act to matters of
federal law.88
Congress also responded to City of Boerne by passing the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),89
which protects both “land use as religious exercise”90 and the
“religious exercise of institutionalized persons.”91 As RLUIPA’s
scope is much narrower and is grounded in Congress’s power under
the Commerce and Spending Clauses,92 it is a valid exercise of
Congressional power.93
2. State RFRAs and constitutional provisions
Post-City of Boerne, the treatment of state law claims for religious
exemption varies greatly from state to state. In response to the
Court’s invalidation of RFRA with respect to state law, many states
have passed their own RFRAs or constitutional amendments
requiring a return to the strict scrutiny standard for religiousexemption cases.94 In other states, the highest court has interpreted
the religious freedom protections in the state constitution as
requiring either strict scrutiny or weak intermediate scrutiny.95
Remaining states have either refused to apply strict scrutiny or have
not yet determined which standard of review applies.96
88. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (applying RFRA to a federal law).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006).
90. Id. § 2000cc.
91. Id. § 2000cc-1.
92. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism:
Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40
URB. LAW. 195, 212 (2008).
93. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1243 (11th Cir. 2004);
see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–20 (2005).
94. See Volokh, supra note 65; see also Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemption Law Map of
the United States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/
07/09/religious-exemption-law-map-of-the-united-states/ [hereinafter Volokh, Religious
Exemption Map]. Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia have each passed a state RFRA, while Alabama enacted its state RFRA via
constitutional amendment. Id.
95. See Volokh, Religious Exemption Map, supra note 94. Courts in Alaska, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Washington,
and Wisconsin interpret their constitutions to require strict scrutiny, while the constitutional
provisions in New York have been interpreted to require intermediate scrutiny. Id.
96. Id.
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B. Overview of Ad Hoc Legislative Accommodations in Specific
Contexts
In addition to the general protections of free exercise that have
been enacted, both federal and state legislatures have enacted
exemptions and accommodations on a context-by-context basis for
individuals who face a test of conscience. Structural concerns dealing
with enumerated powers and federalism limit the scope of
accommodations for both federal and state legislative enactments.
Congressional accommodation has been an avenue for
accommodation both pre- and post-Smith. However, as City of
Boerne made clear, when Congress accommodates conscientious
objectors, it must be acting within the scope of its enumerated
powers.97 Traditional powers that Congress uses to legislate include
its commerce power,98 spending power,99 taxing power,100 and its
power to enforce the civil rights protections granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment.101
State legislatures can also accommodate conscientious objectors
on a context-by-context basis. Unlike Congress, States are not
bound by certain enumerated powers102 and are therefore they are
free to legislate on a broader scope. However, the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution103 prevents states from legislating in a way that
“interferes with and frustrates” a federal interest or statute.104
Another significant limitation on the ability of ad hoc legislative
accommodations to protect conscience is that they can be trumped
by a state’s own constitutional provisions.105 This was demonstrated
in Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-SU Coalition for Choice,106 where
the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a hospital’s policy to only
provide abortions when special criteria were met was in violation of
the state constitution.107 Although the state’s conscience clause
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

1640

See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Id. cl. 1.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
See id. amend. X.
Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988).
Wilson, supra note 10, at 91.
948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
Id. at 965, 973.
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explicitly provided an exemption for the hospital’s conduct, this was
“at most a statutory right” that the legislature could not permissibly
balance against constitutional rights.108 Ultimately, the Court held
that the hospital could not prevent doctors who were qualified and
willing to perform abortions from doing so in its facilities.109
Notwithstanding these limitations, state legislative protections
are ultimately the most likely means of effectively protecting civil
servants who object to same-sex marriage.110 Others have presented a
compelling case for states to accommodate these civil servants in the
same way that the states have recently accommodated religious
beliefs in a variety of other contexts.111
V. REVIEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOMMODATIONS MADE IN OTHER
CONTEXTS
A. General Protections of Free Exercise
Both federal and state legislatures have accommodated
individuals in their beliefs in a variety of contexts. These methods of
accommodation provide a helpful model for accommodating civil
servants who object to same-sex marriage.
1. Accommodation mandated by the First Amendment
Even prior to Employment Division v. Smith,112 the Court’s
protection of conscience under the First Amendment was limited.113
However, the Court did require accommodation under the Free
Exercise Clause in a few limited situations. For example, in Sherbert
v. Verner,114 the Court held that the First Amendment compelled
accommodation for a Sabbatarian woman who was denied
unemployment benefits because she refused to take a job that
required her to work on Saturday.115

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 972.
Id.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
See supra Part III.B.1.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Id. at 409–10.
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In another case, a woman challenged a requirement that an
individual’s picture must appear on their driver’s license, as this
conflicted with her religious beliefs.116 Here, the Eighth Circuit held
that the requirement was an impermissible burden to the woman’s
religious freedom, the state interest was insufficient to justify the
burden, and accommodation of her beliefs was required.117 This
holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court.118
Following the Court’s holding in Smith, it seems doubtful that
the Court would find accommodation required by the First
Amendment.119 However, the judicial branch is still a primary
(although recently passive) actor in the granting of accommodation.
Although the First Amendment has largely been removed as a basis
for accommodation, courts still do interpret and enforce state and
federal legislation requiring accommodation.
2. Federal protections of free exercise
RFRA, although struck as unconstitutional with respect to the
states, is still controlling for questions of federal law.120 The stated
purposes of this statute are:
1. to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
2. to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by government. 121

This statute restores the strict-scrutiny tests previously used and
therefore provides much more protection than the Smith standard,
although only in limited circumstances where the Act applies.122
116. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1122–23 (8th Cir. 1984).
117. Id. at 1123–28.
118. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam).
119. See supra Part III.B.2.
120. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. RFRA was also amended to apply
only to the federal government and the District of Colombia. Esbeck, supra note 87, at 140
(citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1988)
(amended 2001)).
121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2006).
122. It should be noted that strict scrutiny in the religious exemption context, as
implemented by Sherbert and Yoder, has traditionally been much less strict than in other
contexts. See supra note 69.
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3. State RFRAs and constitutional provisions
In states that have enacted them, state RFRAs can require state
laws to grant the same accommodation originally provided by the
federal RFRA. In other states, the courts have provided these same
accommodations by interpreting the state constitutional provisions
protecting religious freedom to require strict scrutiny.123 While these
standards usually apply quite broadly, even providing “‘no
exceptions for the government acting in special capacities,’ for
instance, as an employer,”124 they “are not frequently invoked” and
“the outer limits of the state’s duty to accommodate religious beliefs
are not well-defined.”125
One case where a state strict scrutiny requirement did provide an
accommodation of religious belief was Minnesota v. Hershberger.126
In this case, “members of the Old Order Amish (‘the Amish’)
religion moved in the district court for dismissal of traffic citations
each had received for noncompliance” with a statute requiring
“slow-moving vehicles to display a fluorescent orange-red triangular
sign emblem when being operated on the state’s public highways.”127
When the Minnesota Supreme Court first heard this case
(Hershberger I),128 it held that this requirement was in violation of
the individuals’ First Amendment right to free exercise and approved
an alternative means of safety lighting proposed by the Amish.129 The
State appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, and “[w]hile
that petition was pending, the Court handed down Smith. It then
remanded the Amish case to the State Supreme Court in light of
Smith.”130 On rehearing, the court again held the regulation
impermissible, this time as a violation of the Minnesota
constitution’s religious freedom provision.131
123. See Volokh, supra note 65.
124. Wilson, supra note 4, at 347 (citing Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of
Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 635
(1999)).
125. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. 464 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Hershberger II].
127. Minnesota v. Hershberger, 444 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1989) [hereinafter
Hershberger I].
128. Id.
129. Id. at 289.
130. Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation of Religious-Based Conscientious
Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 726 (1993).
131. Hershberger II, 464 N.W.2d at 399.
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B. Ad Hoc Accommodation by Congress
1. Military service
As previously discussed, Congress allows some exemptions for
conscientious objectors to military service.132 While the Supreme
Court held that these accommodations were not prohibited by the
Establishment Clause, they also are not mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause.133 While this ruling means that most
accommodation of religious freedom must come from the legislative
branch rather than being judicially administered,134 the Court has
clarified the scope of accommodation granted in statutes that
Congress already enacted.
The Court clarified and expanded the scope of military
accommodation allowed under the Selective Training and Service
Act.135 The Court first did this in United States v. Seeger,136 where it
ruled that a belief in God was not required to receive an exemption
under the Act.137 In this case, the Court held that an exemption was
appropriate for an objection based on a sincere “belief in and
devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes.”138
The scope of accommodation for objectors to military service
was extended further still in Welsh v. United States.139 Here, the
Court interpreted Congress’s language to allow accommodation for
conscientious objectors whose “opposition to war stem[s] from
[their] moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and
wrong” as long as “these beliefs be held with the strength of
traditional religious convictions.”140 The Court stated:

132. See supra Part III.B.1.
133. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
134. Volokh, supra note 65. Although the Court has, on rare instances, required
accommodation when none was contemplated by Congress, the chances of this happening
seem small post-Smith. See, e.g., Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946) (holding that
an individual who objected to serving in a combatant role, but not to military service in
general, could be granted U.S. citizenship).
135. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 625, § 5(g), 54
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–473 (1988)).
136. 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 166.
139. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
140. Id. at 340.
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If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely
ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose
upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from participating in any
war at any time . . . such an individual is as much entitled to a
“religious” conscientious objector exemption . . . as is someone
who derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional
religious convictions.141

This holding expands the scope of conscientious objection so as to
cover much more than what would be traditionally considered
“religious” belief. By granting exemptions based on the belief’s
binding effect on the individual rather than the source of those
beliefs, the Court’s holding accommodates even those plaintiffs who
do not consider themselves religious.142
However, as was discussed previously, the Court subsequently
limited this holding by accommodating only those who are
“conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”143
While this holding was consistent with Congress’s language in the
Selective Service and Training Act,144 it was significant that the Court
held the Free Exercise Clause did not require any exemptions
beyond those explicitly provided in the Act.145
2. Payment of taxes
Congress has also given partial accommodation of beliefs to
individuals who have various conscientious objections to the
payment and receipt of taxes. Individuals object to the payment of
taxes for a variety of reasons, and Congress has accommodated some
of the conscientious objections. One area where Congress has
accommodated religious beliefs is in the payment and receipt of
Social Security taxes by self-employed individuals.146 Participation in
this system goes against fundamental beliefs of some individuals,

141. Id.
142. Flowers, supra note 130, at 704.
143. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971) (emphasis added) (quoting
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
144. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 783, ch. 625, § 5(g), 54
Stat. 885, 889 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–73 (1988)).
145. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461–62.
146. Flowers, supra note 130, at 711–12.
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such as the Amish, who promote self-sufficiency and the
responsibility to take care of one’s own family.147
Although Congress did accommodate these individuals,148 the
Court in United States v. Lee149 held that this accommodation could
not be extended beyond the self-employed, even if both the
employer and the employee shared the same legitimate conscientious
objection to participation in this program.150 The Court reasoned
that “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent
in a manner that violates their religious belief.”151 Due to Congress’s
narrow crafting of the statute, this exemption is also only available to
active participants of “a sect that teaches both . . . self-sufficiency and
rejection of government social insurance benefits.”152 This is a stark
departure
from
the
belief-focused,
organization-neutral
153
accommodation granted in the military context.
One context where Congress has not accommodated individuals
with a conscientious objection is the payment of taxes supporting the
military. “Because government revenue finances the equipment and
prosecution of war, some believe that by withholding tax payments,
a protest against war can be made and, at the same time, one’s
conscience can be satisfied by nonparticipation.”154 There are various
ways that objectors engage in war tax protest,155 none of which have
received Congressional accommodation.156 Despite the parallels to
military conscientious objection, the Court has not required any
exemption for war tax protestors,157 which is consistent with the
overall treatment of requests for accommodation under the First
Amendment.158

147. Id.
148. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1988).
149. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
150. Flowers, supra note 130, at 712.
151. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
152. Flowers, supra note 130, at 712–13 (citing Hughes v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 683
(1983); Borntrager v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1243 (1990)).
153. See supra Part V.B.1.
154. Flowers, supra note 130, at 714.
155. See id. (describing methods used by war tax protestors).
156. Id. at 714–16.
157. See id.
158. See supra Parts III.B.2, V.B.1–2.
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3. Health Care
Congressional accommodation of conscientious objectors who
provide medical care is arguably the most comprehensive protection
Congress provides to conscientious objectors. The Church
Amendment,159 enacted in 1973160 in response to Roe v. Wade,161
states that the receipt of public funds
by any individual or entity does not authorize any court or any
public official or other public authority to require . . . such
individual to perform or assist in the performance of any
sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or assistance
in the performance of such procedure or abortion would be
contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.162

The amendment also prohibits health care providers who receive
public funds from discriminating against an employee “because he
refused to perform or assist in the performance of such a procedure
or abortion . . . because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions
respecting sterilization procedures or abortions.”163
This congressional accommodation is particularly significant
when its impact is considered. The amendment requires
accommodation even in the face of “the very strong constitutional
164
rights to abortion and contraception established in Roe v. Wade.”
Furthermore, before its enactment, some family planning
organizations were fairly successful in compelling health care
providers to make controversial services available to their patients.165
This illustrates both the power accommodation can have and the
types of moral conflicts that can easily occur if accommodation is not
provided.

159. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006).
160. The Church Amendment was included as part of the Health Programs Extension
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91.
161. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. § 300a-7(b)(1).
163. § 300a-7(c).
164. Wilson, supra note 10, at 79.
165. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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C. Ad Hoc Accommodation by State Legislatures
1. Health Care
In response to Roe v. Wade and to further the purpose of the
Church
Amendment,
states
began
enacting
legislation
accommodating health care professionals with a conscientious
objection to performing certain procedures.166 By the end of 1978,
virtually all states had enacted similar legislation, providing some
degree of exemption for conscientious objectors.167 However, the
degree of protection and ease of claiming an exemption varies
drastically from state to state.168 For example, in order to claim an
exemption, some states require only that a conscientious objector
provide notice to patients beforehand.169 Others focus more on the
patient, allowing conscientious exemption as long as it would not
“pose a ‘road block’ to the patient’s ability to access the desired
service from another provider.”170 Other states impose a referral
requirement “requir[ing] the doctor or institution to facilitate the
patient’s ability to get the service from another provider.”171 Finally,
some states impose more onerous terms, “permit[ting] an objection
only if the objector ‘shows proof’ or states the reasons for objecting
in writing.”172
After the passage of the Church Amendment and subsequent
state legislation, the issue laid dormant for a number of years.173
However, nearly twenty years later the growth of managed health
care providers complicated the issue, leading some states to enact
further legislation.174 For example, in 1997, Illinois, North Dakota,
and Texas enacted laws that expanded the accommodations
traditionally granted in two important ways.175 “First, these newer
166. Rachel Benson Gold, Conscience Makes a Comeback in the Age of Managed Care, 1
GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 1 (Feb. 1998); see also JODY FEDER, THE HISTORY AND
EFFECT OF ABORTION CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LAWS 2 (2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf.
167. See Gold, supra note 166.
168. Wilson, supra note 10, at 90.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Gold, supra note 166, at 1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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laws go beyond abortion and sterilization . . . to apply to any health
service about which an ethical, religious or moral objection is
raised.”176 For example, the statute might be invoked to
accommodate a reproductive endocrinologist with a conscientious
objection to providing in vitro fertilization to a lesbian couple.
The second expansion introduced by these laws is that they
“explicitly take into account changes in the health care marketplace
by greatly expanding the category of entities allowed to claim a
conscientious objection. These now include not only health care
providers . . . but also corporate payers, such as health plans.”177 This
essentially “invest[s] a wide range of entities with the right to claim a
corporate ‘conscience’ and opt out of paying for any health care
service at will.”178 These protections have not been adopted as
uniformly as the post-Roe v. Wade accommodations, leaving many
organizations and health care professionals with a moral dilemma.179
2. Prescription drugs
The provision and coverage of prescription medication is one
context where the expansion of accommodation described above180 is
required to protect the religious beliefs of both the pharmacists who
dispense prescription drugs and corporations that may pay for them
as part of their health care plans. These concerns are raised primarily
with respect to prescription contraceptives, whose usage is
considered a sin by the Roman Catholic Church181 and which some
pharmacists object to dispensing, considering it tantamount to
participating in an abortion.182
a. Employers’ healthcare coverage. In states that have not enacted
legislation allowing employers to claim a conscientious objection,
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See infra Part V.C.2.
180. Referring to the expansion of accommodation to 1) cover health care-related
conscientious objections beyond abortion and sterilization and 2) allow corporate payers to
claim a conscientious objection.
181. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 75 (Cal.
2004).
182. Jennifer E. Spreng, Conscientious Objectors Behind the Counter: Statutory Defense to
Tort Liability for Failure to Dispense Contraceptives, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
337, 337–38 (2008).
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religiously affiliated employers may be forced to pay for services or
medication that they oppose. In December 2000, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission found that an employer who
had excluded prescription contraception from its health care plan
“engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”183 Shortly after this finding, a
federal district court in Washington held that engaging in this
practice constituted sex discrimination under Title VII.184 This trend
suggests that more and more employers will be required to pay for
prescription contraceptives, even if in direct contradiction to their
religious beliefs.
Even objecting employers in states that have enacted exemptions
allowing organizations to claim a conscientious objection have been
forced to provide prescription contraceptives. In Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court,185 Catholic Charities sought an
injunction exempting them from the duty of providing prescription
contraceptives in its health care plan as required by the Women’s
Contraception Equity Act (WCEA).186 The WCEA, enacted in 1999,
included explicit accommodations for religious employers that object
to providing plans that cover contraceptives.187 However, the
California Supreme Court ruled that although Catholic Charities
“considers itself obliged to follow the Roman Catholic Church’s
religious teachings” and therefore believed that it would be
facilitating sin by offering insurance for prescription contraceptives, it
“d[id] not qualify as a religious employer under the WCEA” and
could not be exempted under the statute.188 These examples clearly
demonstrate that even in states that have enacted legislation
accommodating religion, seeking to only accommodate a narrow
class of individuals may leave many unprotected.
b. Pharmacists. Like employers who provide insurance coverage,
pharmacists with a conscientious objection to providing certain
183. EEOC, DECISION ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION (Dec. 14, 2000),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html.
184. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1277 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(“[T]he exclusion of prescription contraceptives creates a gaping hole in the coverage offered
to female employees, leaving a fundamental and immediate health care need uncovered.”).
185. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
186. Id. at 73.
187. Id. at 74, 76.
188. Id. at 75–76.
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medications have been accommodated in some states, while in other
states they have not been afforded any protection. Many pharmacists’
trial of conscience began with the advent of RU-486, which
“induces abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy without surgical
intervention,” and “Plan B” emergency contraception, both of
which are seen by some pharmacists as tantamount to abortion.189
With the advent of these new medications, many pharmacists find
themselves faced with a moral dilemma that they likely did not
anticipate when they entered their professions.
The response to this moral dilemma has varied greatly from state
to state. Some states have enacted legislation accommodating
pharmacists with a conscientious objection to distributing these
medications190 while others have existing laws “that arguably relieve
pharmacists from employment consequences, professional ethics
violations, criminal liability, and civil liability for refusing to
dispense.”191 The broadened conscience clause legislation recently
enacted in some states may also provide protection for pharmacists,
although that would depend greatly on both the language of the
statute and how courts interpreted that language.192
This accommodation has not gone unnoticed by “[p]ro-choice
activist groups” who have pushed back against legislation
accommodating pharmacists.193 Some states and pharmacy boards
have shown sympathy for these arguments and have passed “must-

189. Spreng, supra note 182, at 337–38.
190. Id. at 338 n.13 (citation omitted) (citing exemptions in Arkansas, Georgia,
Mississippi, and South Dakota); accord Steve Ertelt, Washington State Capitulates, Sees Pro-Life
Pharmacists’ Conscience Rights, LIFENEWS.COM (July 9, 2010), http://www.lifenews.com/
2010/07/09/state-5241/ (same).
191. Spreng, supra note 182, at 339 (footnotes omitted) (citing laws in California,
Georgia, Illinois, Florida, and Maine that may each provide some protection for pharmacists’
beliefs).
192. See supra Part V.C.1; see also Wilson, supra note 10, at 79 (stating that state
conscience clauses increasingly allow individuals to refuse to participate in “the dispensing of
emergency contraceptives”); SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 299 app. (Douglas Laycock et al. eds. 2008) (appendix listing state
accommodations of conscience in the health care context); Spreng, supra note 182, at 339
nn.14–18 (listing existing accommodations that may apply to pharmacists); id. at 374 (stating
that, although “[a]pproximately fifteen states have conscience legislation that may protect
religious pharmacists from legal consequences if they refuse to dispense contraceptives[,] . . .
[t]he reality is far more obscure”).
193. Spreng, supra note 182, at 340.
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dispense” laws that “require pharmacists to dispense contraception
regardless of conscience.”194
The Washington state pharmacy board approved such rules in
2007 “making pharmacists dispense all drugs, including those that
would violate their moral or religious views.”195 Ralph’s Thriftway, a
pharmacy located in the state, brought suit in federal court
challenging this regulation, seeking “the right to refuse to stock or
dispense Plan B . . . based on [pharmacists’] conscientious
objection” as the law forces them into “choosing between their
livelihoods and their deeply held religious and moral beliefs.”196
Before trial began, “attorneys for the State of Washington told a
federal judge that it would create new rules for pharmacists with
conscientious objections to dispensing the morning after pill,” at
which point Plaintiffs agreed to postpone the trial until after the
rulemaking process concluded.197 The State likely did this in light of
the expected outcome of trial, as the judge had issued a preliminary
injunction against the new rules, allowing pharmacists to refuse to fill
a prescription if they refer customers to a pharmacy where they can
get their order filled.198
Although the probable outcome of that case seemed like it
would favor accommodation, suits challenging “must-dispense” laws
or regulations in other states may not be as successful, especially in
light of the Smith decision.199 Furthermore, even in states that do
not have “must-dispense” laws, “[m]any pharmacies have terminated
refusing pharmacists” rather than allow another pharmacist to fill
those prescriptions.200 The only real way to ensure that objecting
pharmacists are accommodated is through state legislation allowing
them to refuse to stock certain medications.
194. Id. States that have enacted this legislation include California, New Jersey, Illinois,
and Washington. See Ertelt, supra note 190.
195. Ertelt, supra note 190.
196. Id. (citation omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. The judge also stated: “On the issue of free exercise of religion alone, the
evidence before the court convinces it that the plaintiffs . . . have demonstrated both a
likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury.” Id. (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
199. See also Spreng, supra note 182, at 341 & n.28 (“Court challenges to ‘must-fill’
statutes and rules have produced mixed results.”); Id. at 365–71 (explaining why free exercise
claims for accommodation are unlikely to succeed).
200. Id. at 341 & n.30 (citing cases where pharmacists were fired or not hired due to
their refusal to distribute contraceptives).
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Surveys indicate that legislation accommodating conscientious
objectors is supported by most Americans, with “[s]ixty-five percent
support[ing] pharmacist[s’] right to decline to fill or counsel for
prescription drugs which violate their moral or religious views.”201
Professional pharmacist associations have also issued “endorsements
of conscience protections for pharmacists that would not impede
customer access to prescription drugs.”202 Many of the concerns that
do exist relate to the customer’s ability to purchase the prescription
drugs.203 However, these concerns have been and can continue to be
addressed by imposing referral requirements on conscientious
objectors, as many states have already done in the health care
context.204
In spite of the popular approval and the ease with which states
can address access concerns, only a small number of states have
enacted legislation accommodating pharmacists. The reason more
states have not enacted accommodating legislation may be due to
the “relatively small number of [individuals] who find themselves
morally conflicted.”205 However, the fact that some states have
accommodated pharmacists who object to providing certain
medications may help other states follow suit.
3. Adoption Agencies
A group of conscientious objectors that have not received any
accommodation for their religious beliefs are the adoption agencies
that object to providing adoptions to same-sex couples. A number of
recent cases have found that the Free Exercise Clause does not
protect agencies from the requirement to provide adoptions that go
against their religious beliefs.206 This lack of accommodation has led

201. Ertelt, supra note 190.
202. Spreng, supra note 182, at 339.
203. See, e.g., Julie Cantor & Ken Baum, The Limits of Conscientious Objection — May
Pharmacists Refuse to Fill Prescriptions for Emergency Contraception?, 351 N. ENG. J. MED.
2008,
2009–10
(2004),
available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMsb042263; Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Protection and Limits of Conscientious Objection:
When Conscientious Objection Is Unethical, 28 MED. & L. 337, 341 (2009).
204. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
205. Bleich, supra note 7, at 247.
206. E.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Adoption
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999);
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (holding that a same-sex couple may jointly
adopt the two subject children).

1653

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/10/2011 5:23 PM

2011

some agencies to close their doors rather than provide these
adoptions.207
Although these closures have not resulted in any
accommodation, they have had an effect on the overall public
perception of same-sex marriage. Specifically, the failure to
accommodate adoption agencies may rally the public against samesex marriage in other contexts. This was seen in California, where
one of the Proposition 8 commercials stated: “If Proposition 8 fails,
religious adoption agencies may be forced to place children in same
sex marriages or discontinue providing adoption services altogether.
That’s what happened to Catholic Charities in Massachusetts.”208
This suggests that accommodation of individuals with a religious
objection to same-sex marriage in states where it has been adopted
may facilitate its adoption in other states.
VI. LESSONS FROM ACCOMMODATION IN OTHER CONTEXTS
This review of the mechanisms by which conscience is protected
and the key areas where it has and has not received protection can
assist those considering how states can best accommodate
conscientious objectors. This Comment will now apply the
information in this review to the accommodation of civil servants
who object to performing or facilitating same-sex marriages.
A. The Most Likely Avenue for Accommodation of Civil Servants
The Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment post-Smith
will likely provide no protection for the civil servants’ beliefs.
Furthermore, courts consistently have found no First Amendment
protection for conscientious objectors.
Congress’s legislation providing general protections of religious
freedom will also be of little value for civil servants who object to
facilitating same-sex marriages. As a matter of state law, the provision
of marriage to same-sex couples would fall outside the scope of
protection of the federal RFRA. Furthermore, RLUIPA would not
207. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 10, at 209 (discussing how Catholic Charities in
Massachusetts stopped providing adoptions when faced with the choice of providing adoptions
to same-sex couples or losing its license); Same-sex ‘Marriage’ Law Forces D.C. Catholic
Charities to Close Adoption Program, CATHOLICNEWSAGENCY.COM (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://tinyurl.com/yl5r69x.
208. PreservingMarriage, YES on Proposition 8 (Prop 8) Your Rights, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A-jc4ujp9Ok.
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be of any assistance, as it provides protections for prisoners and with
respect to property dispute issues. Targeted congressional legislation
enacted on an ad hoc basis would also have a very small chance of
providing protection, as this area of law would likely be considered
outside of Congress’s power to legislate.
As this is a state law issue, state RFRAs and constitutional
provisions may provide some objecting civil servants with
protections. No state mandating strict scrutiny has addressed the
issue of accommodation for religious objectors to same-sex
marriage.209 However, there is a strong argument that a case for a
religious accommodation, even for civil servants, would be successful
under the strict scrutiny standard.210 The success of such a case
would likely hinge on which law was challenged and what the court
perceived the government interest to be.211 The determination of this
issue would need to be resolved on a state-by-state basis, and would
depend entirely on the analysis of the highest court of each state
hearing the issue. This makes protection both unpredictable and
difficult to obtain, as it would require that a civil servant lose her job
and then litigate a difficult case with no guarantee of
accommodation, which in itself is quite burdensome and financially
prohibitive.

209. Cf. Wilson, supra note 4, at 346–47 (failing to mention any cases when discussing
this issue and specifically noting that as “state RFRAs ‘are not frequently invoked,’ . . . the
outer limits of the state’s duty to religious beliefs are not well-defined”) (citation omitted).
None of the states that allow same-sex marriage have constitutions that have been interpreted
to require strict scrutiny. See Volokh, Religious Exemption Map, supra note 94. Only
Connecticut, which enacted religious exemptions—although not for civil servants—when
legalizing same-sex marriage, had previously enacted a state RFRA. Wilson, supra note 4, at
347.
210. Wilson, supra note 4, at 346–47.
211. There would likely be a substantial burden in a civil-servant accommodation case, as
the government is “compelling someone to do something that violates his religious beliefs.”
Volokh, supra note 65. Therefore, for a statute to survive, the government would have to
demonstrate that it is using the least restrictive means possible of reaching a compelling
governmental interest. If same-sex marriage is taken as a given and a state’s equal provision of
services statute is challenged, it may very well pass strict scrutiny.
However, if a court were to apply strict scrutiny directly to the state law allowing
same-sex marriage, the result may be different. These cases would likely depend on what the
court perceived the governmental interest to be. If the court saw the interest being the
provision of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples, laws allowing same-sex marriage may
not pass strict scrutiny, as less restrictive means, such as civil unions, would accomplish this
same objective. This means that these provisions may invalidate a law allowing same-sex
marriage, but may not invalidate a law compelling equal protection or provision of services.
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Due to the weaknesses in the protection offered by state RFRAs
and constitutional provisions, and the probable inefficacy of federal
constitutional and congressional protections, the best and most likely
avenue of accommodation is through ad hoc exemptions enacted by
the legislature of each state.
B. Guidance Regarding How State Legislatures Can Best
Accommodate Civil Servants
With effective accommodation likely being left to state
legislatures, these issues will ultimately be decided on a state-by-state
basis. However, this review shows that protections for beliefs held by
a small subset of the population are infrequently enacted and
narrowly crafted, likely for the reasons discussed in Part II.C. For the
states that do enact accommodating legislation, the first states that
enact legislation will likely serve as a guide for states that follow.
Therefore, states enacting accommodations should write legislation
carefully to ensure the most effective protection for conscientious
objectors.
One lesson that can be gleaned from the above review for states
seeking to accommodate conscientious objectors is that statutes that
are crafted too narrowly or ambiguously will leave many individuals
without protection. As was discussed, courts significantly limited the
individuals to which the statute applied based on the language in the
statute when reviewing accommodation relating to military service,
payment of taxes, and the provision of contraceptives as part of
employer health care coverage. The opinions in these cases did not
suggest that these individuals’ beliefs were any less sincere or
important; they simply fell outside the court’s narrow interpretation
of what the legislature explicitly protected.
The review of accommodation provided to health care providers
by states offers further guidance regarding how statutes should be
crafted. Accommodation in that context clearly shows that state
constitutional
provisions
will
trump
statutes
providing
accommodation for conscientious objectors. This further suggests
that states providing accommodation for their civil servants will have
to carefully craft the statute so as to not run afoul of constitutional
protections.
Finally, accommodations granted in both the health care and
prescription drug contexts suggest that legislation that
accommodates civil servants while still providing equal service to all
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members of the public is the least objectionable, as both traditional
and same-sex couples will be afforded equal treatment. In the
prescription drug and healthcare contexts, this was accomplished
through employee referrals. Scholars have suggested a similar
“information forcing” system for same-sex marriage, with “rules that
require refusing parties to direct couples to others who will perform
the service.”212 This system would “allow protection for matters of
conscience without sacrificing access or humiliating same-sex
couples.”213 These types of accommodation would also be likely to
pass constitutional review, as all comers would receive the same
treatment.214 Moreover, these types of accommodations will likely
not have a large impact, as scholars hypothesize that few civil
servants will claim this exemption.215
C. Current Methods of Accommodation Are Ineffective
On a much broader level, methods of accommodation that are
currently available may be ineffective because beliefs held by a small
subset of the population are infrequently protected, and even when
minority beliefs are protected, the legislation is often narrowly
crafted. Furthermore, as is discussed above, courts have consistently
interpreted protections narrowly, not because the beliefs of
individuals were any less significant, but because the language in the
statute was ambiguous. These failings of the current system suggest
that further scholarship should be conducted to explore either 1)
other possible avenues of accommodation or 2) ways that current
avenues can be modified to provide greater protection to
conscientious objectors.
212. Wilson, supra note 10, at 98.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 97–100.
215. For example, as Stern has observed:
[R]eligious believers who oppose same-sex marriages . . . should not be required to
act directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that appear to
confer their personal blessing on such marriages. While such exemptions are
necessary, there are probably far fewer people around who would invoke such
exemptions than is generally thought.
Stern, supra note 42, at 308 (although discussing accommodation only for private
providers of commercial services). But see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 29, at 295
(“[B]ecause the exemption is potentially much broader in scope than other religious
exemptions, and lacks the practical constraints present in the employment context . . .
proponents [may not be] correct in predicting that the exemption would have little effect
on same-sex couples.”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
An examination of the current methods of accommodation offers
significant guidance for states considering accommodating civil
servants opposed to same-sex marriage. This accommodation will
most likely come from state legislatures on an ad hoc basis, and the
best method of accommodation would allow civil servants to abstain
from facilitating same-sex marriage while still providing the same
services to same-sex couples, likely through a referral service. The
accommodations currently provided in the United States do not
effectively accommodate religious belief and new avenues of
accommodation should be explored.
Matthew Chandler
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